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ABSTRACT 
This paper attempts to show, by means of  arguments by Theodor W. Adorno, that Richard 
Rorty’s criticism of  Moral Realism is not fully developed, and further, that Rorty himself  
proposes a naïve account, in which the ethnic group functions as an ultimate measure of  moral 
judgment without any possibility of  critique. By contrast Adorno offers a figure of  thought by 
which, even without the assumption of  a Moral Realism in the traditional sense, such a 
criticism is entirely possible. The paper will end with the consideration that Adorno’s 
philosophy can be described as a kind of  enlightened Moral Realism. 
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„Einer fragte Herrn K., ob es einen Gott gäbe.  
Herr K. sagte: ‚Ich rate dir, nachzudenken, ob 
dein Verhalten  
je nach der Antwort auf  diese Frage sich ändern 
würde.  
Würde es sich nicht ändern, dann können wir die 
Frage fallenlassen.“ 
(Bertolt Brecht. Geschichten von Herrn Keuner) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Current discourse in practical philosophy has seen so-called moral realism re-
emerge as a controversial topic. Moral realism is here defined as positing the 
existence of  eternal and universal moral values, independent of  the discretion of  a 
moral agent. This has not always been a controversial topic. In particular, 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy, aimed to put an end to the thesis of  the 
existence of  timeless values in favor of  the increased life of  the individual, and to 
establish a relativistic vitalism instead of  a moral realism. Today, however, we see 
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attempts to defend moral realism against this Nietzschean attack, but these 
attempts are not without their own fierce criticism.  
One of  the most prominent representatives of  today’s criticism of  realist 
positions within Ethics is Richard Rorty, who in many ways draws on Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. One of  his much-discussed, and also criticized, general theses is the 
following: instead of  eternal and universal values it is solidarity with members of  
one’s own ethnic group that should serve as guide for what is to be understood as 
good behavior. Thus conventions supersede universal moral values, and 
respectively concrete conventions in one’s lived life are, through Rorty’s approach, 
to be saved from the hubris of  a metaphysical grounding of  morality, which shifts 
the scale of  moral action into an afterlife. 
This paper will not make another attempt to defend moral realism against 
Rorty’s critique. It rather confronts Rorty’s position with arguments by Theodor 
W. Adorno, noting that Adorno also follows the Nietzschean critical attitude 
towards the assertion of  eternal and universal values. In this regard, Rorty and 
Adorno are connected via similar starting points. By turning these two 
philosophers against one another, however, it not only becomes clear how diverse 
relativistic moral critiques can be; we also gain interesting insights into Rorty’s 
critical design, which, in turn, also enables a new understanding of  Adorno’s 
critique. Adorno also refers to the actual present life world as a reference point for 
moral action. However, for him this reality is not unquestionable and also not our 
ultimate reference for choosing an action, such as it seems to be for Rorty. Adorno 
rather scrutinizes this reality and its norms of  actions. 
The purpose of  this paper now is to demonstrate that Adorno fundamentally 
confronts Rorty’s position. Rorty’s criticism of  moral realism does not reach far 
enough and itself  ends up at a rather naive moral realism, in which the ethnic 
group functions as the ultimate measure of  moral judgment, thus without any 
possibility to criticize this premise itself. By contrast Adorno offers a figure of  
thought by which even without the assumption of  a moral realism in the 
traditional sense, such a criticism is entirely possible. At the end this paper will 
finally suggest that Adorno’s philosophy could be described as a kind of  
enlightened moral realism. 
In order to achieve these goals the paper first depicts Rorty’s position. This is 
followed by the reconstruction of  Adorno’s philosophy and a comparison of  the 
two positions, which will show how Rorty’s standpoint cannot withstand 
Adorno’s critique.  
 
 
2. Rorty: Solidarity rather than Objectivity  
 
The idea of  moral realism arises from the context of  a philosophy that must be 
‘Solidarity at the Time of  the Fall’: Adorno and Rorty on Moral Realism 
 
 
552 
 
understood as a fundamental science, the science of  the general, unchangeable and 
necessary, by means of  abstraction. Rorty set himself  the goal to bid farewell to 
this idea of  philosophy, in order to lead the discipline out of  its – as stated by 
Nietzsche – “loss of  reality”. Instead, a “postmetaphysical culture” (Rorty 1989, 
xvi) became an objective in working against the separation of  philosophy from 
life’s reality, which bids farewell to the assumption of  “permanent truths of  
reason and temporary truths of  fact” (Rorty 1991 I, 176). The fundamental 
accusation of  a ‘life-distance’ can also be applied to the requirements of  a 
metaphysico-objective morality, which is demanded within the argumentative 
frame of  moral realism and suggests an attitude of  escape from the contingencies 
of  life. Showing that this is impossible became one of  the main focuses of  Rorty’s 
philosophy, who, following philosophers like the already mentioned Nietzsche, 
William James and John Dewey tried to introduce a pragmatic turn to philosophy, 
with which philosophy and life praxis could close ranks. Thus Rorty argues for the 
disavowal of  the “belief  that there are, out there in the world, real essences which 
it is our duty to discover and which are disposed to assist in their own discovery” 
(Rorty 1989, 75). With this in mind, it is pointless to seek for the essence of  
anything, including morality, if  only because our reality constantly alters, and 
because of  this an essence (if  such a thing even existed) would be subject to 
constant change, too. Plato’s distinct different spheres are no longer available with 
Rorty, nor is the idea of  a morality as the morality.  
But in order to approach the phenomenon that we call “morality” (escaping 
our vocabulary is only conditionally possible) we have to – in a pragmatic sense – 
focus on social practices, because “there is nothing deep down inside us except 
what we have to put there ourselves, no criterion that we have not created in the 
course of  creating a practice, no standard of  rationality that is not an appeal to 
such a criterion, no rigorous argumentation that is not obedience to our own 
conventions” (Rorty 1982, xlii).  
Thus it is necessary to lift the veil of  our commonly used terms and to become 
aware of  social practice as a constitutive variable. The same applies to morality. 
Morality can be understood as a result of  social practice, which implies a constant 
and always contextually embedded change:  
 
If  we are inclined to philosophize, we shall want the vocabulary offered by 
Dewey, Heidegger, Davidson, and Derrida, with its built-in cautions against 
metaphysics, rather than that offered by Descartes, Hume, and Kant. For if  
we use the former vocabulary, we shall be able to see moral progress as a 
history of  making rather than finding, of  poetic achievement by ‘radically 
situated’ individuals and communities, rather than as the gradual unveiling, 
through the use of  ‘reason’, of  ‘principles’ or ‘rights’ or ‘value’ (Rorty 1991 
I, 188-189). 
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Although Rorty obviously polemicizes against metaphysical principles of  
philosophy, he also adheres to a principle, which can be associated directly in the 
sphere of  morality: solidarity. This term can serve as an example of  how Rorty’s 
understanding of  a moral principle in a specific context of  life is supposed to 
work. Rorty’s view of  solidarity is an alternative to an understanding of  
solidarity that is dependent on objectivity (which traditionally depends on the 
belief  of  the Humane), as the so-called realists construct it. Rorty claims that 
such realists necessarily demand 
implausible additional assumptions, as they  
 
have to construe truth as correspondence to reality. So they must construct 
a metaphysics which has room for a special relation between beliefs and 
objects which will differentiate true from false beliefs. They also must argue 
that there are procedures of  justification of  belief  which are natural and 
not merely local. So they must construct an epistemology which has room 
for a kind of  justification which is not merely social but natural, springing 
from human nature itself, and made possible by a link between that part of  
nature and the rest of  nature (Rorty 1991 II, 22). 
 
According to Rorty these necessary assumptions cannot be designed 
convincingly. He therefore considers it preferable to focus on the concrete life 
context to illustrate solidarity. This depends on identification-categories with 
which we calculate the proximity of  a person to us, in order to develop a sense of  
solidarity. Even though this is a psychological (and intuitive) and not a systematic 
argument, Rorty applies it against the notion of  universal moral principles. 
Specifically, he applies his argumentation against humanism: identification with 
the humane is not enough to motivate solidarity, claiming that “‘because she is a 
human being’ is a weak, unconvincing explanation of  a generous action” (Rorty 
1989, 191). A thus-constructed ethical universalism therefore ignores the fact that 
we feel closer to people, with whom “imaginative identification is easier” (Rorty 
1989, 191). 
Of  course, Rorty is aware of  the fact that such thinking does not come 
without presuppositions, but rather depends on an age-old ethical discourse that 
recognizes human solidarity as a value. It hence becomes clear that Rorty cannot 
get away from a specific vocabulary, which is the product of  an indubitable 
ethnocentrism (Rorty 1991 II, 23, 29). Rorty here agrees with Putnam (a well-
known colleague in the criticism of  moral realism), that we can only obtain a 
better view of  morality whilst speaking of  a tradition (with its echoes of  the 
Bible, philosophy, democratic revolutions and so on), instead of  proclaiming a 
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supposedly ahistorical position, as moral realists do. This leaves us with a simple 
formula for the definitions of  our moral values: those beliefs are “true […] which 
he or she finds good to believe” (Rorty 1991 II, 24) – and this cost-benefit 
calculation is always embedded in different contexts of  history, life circumstances 
etc. A realist will tend to interpret this type of  view as another positive theory 
about the nature of  truth, that is, as a theory according to which the truth is only 
a respective opinion of  an individual or a group. “But the pragmatist”, Rorty 
says, “does not have a theory of  truth, much less a relativistic one. As a partisan 
of  solidarity, his account of  the value of  cooperative human inquiry has only an 
ethical base, not an epistemological or metaphysical one. Not having any 
epistemology, a forteriori he does not have a relativistic one” (Rorty 1991 II, 24). 
The accusation of  being a relativist can thus be read as a projection of  the 
realists, “for the realist thinks that the whole point of  philosophical thought is to 
detach oneself  from any particular community and look down at it from a more 
universal standpoint” (Rorty 1991 II, 30), but those who think they can see 
axioms are just victims of  a “Cartesian fallacy of  seeing axioms where there are 
only shared habits, of  viewing statements which summarize such practices as if  
they reported constraints enforcing such practices” (Rorty 1991 II, 26). 
 Ultimately Rorty’s critique of  metaphysics culminates in an argument 
promulgated by Nietzsche, who demands we renounce the metaphysical ghost 
constructions and dive into the ‘real’: 
 
[the] traditional Western metaphysico-epistemological way of  firming up our 
habits simply isn’t working anymore. It isn’t doing its job. It has become as 
transparent a device as the postulation of  deities who turn out, by a happy 
coincidence, to have chosen us as their people. So the pragmatist suggestion 
that we substitute a ‘merely’ ethical foundation for our sense of  community – 
or, better, that we think of  our sense of  community as having no foundation 
except shared hope and the trust created by such sharing – is put forward on 
practical grounds (Rorty 1991 II, 33). 
 
 
3. ‘Solidarity at the Time of  the Fall’1: Metaphysics and Ethics in Adorno 
 
Rorty’s accomplished anti-metaphysical and pragmatist turn in favor of  an 
emphasis on solidarity can, on the one hand, be seen as a demand to free actually 
lived morality from the claims of  moral realism, which urges people to follow the 
supposedly morally higher sphere of  timeless values instead, a sphere separated 
                                                 
1 Adorno 1992, 408: “There is solidarity between such [i.e. negative dialectical] thinking and 
metaphysics at the time of  its fall.” 
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from actual life. On the other hand, the difficulties of  such a conception are 
particularly evident when one’s own ethnocentric standpoint becomes a subject of  
critical assessment, because Rorty cannot provide any sort of  standard against 
which his theory can be proven. However, as noted earlier in the introduction, this 
section of  the paper is not supposed to go further into the development of  a 
transcendental argumentation, but instead wants to ask: Does Rorty’s supposedly 
enlightened critical attitude, with which he rejects moral realism in favor of  the 
fullness of  lived morality, go far enough to deserve the name of  profound 
criticism? Or is Rorty’s pragmatism to be characterized as mere opportunism, 
compared to a standard of  criticism that will be introduced in the following? 
The figure of  thought that will be consulted for this exam is Adorno’s critique 
of  society. Like Rorty within his concept of  pragmatism, Adorno refuses to use 
metaphysical arguments for the discussion of  the question of  the successful life. If  
moral realism is to be understood as a concept that postulates or tries to prove the 
existence of  timeless values that, in the end, tell us what we should do, and prove 
the quality of  moral goodness or define moral obligations, then Adorno is no more 
a realist than Rorty is. However, the motive that leads Adorno to such a decline is 
slightly different to Rorty’s – in general, it can be named ‘Auschwitz’.  
For Adorno, Auschwitz is the bankruptcy of  any metaphysics that either tries 
to transcend the finite world altogether or claims to deduce some meaning of  
finite being from a transcendental world. “After Auschwitz, our feelings resist any 
claim of  the positivity of  existence as sanctimonious, as wronging the victims; 
they balk at squeezing any kind of  sense, however bleached, out of  the victim’s 
fate” (Adorno 1992, 361). This metaphysical thesis of  the significance of  finite 
being implicitly sanctions the horrors of  the concentrations camps, instead of  
making it explicit and thus become an ally to fascism. However, the absurdness 
that Auschwitz has brought to light is the radical nullity of  individuals that suffer 
a mechanized and industrialized death in the gas chambers:  
 
The administrative murder of  millions made of  death a thing one had never 
yet to fear in just this fashion. There is no chance any more for death to 
come into the individual’s empirical life as somehow conformable with the 
course of  that life. The last, the poorest possession left to the individual is 
expropriated. That in the concentration camps it was no longer an 
individual who dies, but a specimen—this is a fact bound to affect the dying 
of  those who escaped the administrative measure. Genocide is absolute 
integration. It is on its way wherever men are leveled off—‘polished off ’, as 
the German military called it—until one exterminates them literally, as 
deviations from the concept of  their total nullity. Auschwitz confirmed the 
philosopheme of  pure identity as death (Adorno 1992, 362). 
 
‘Solidarity at the Time of  the Fall’: Adorno and Rorty on Moral Realism 
 
 
556 
 
If  we take a close look at this quote, several aspects become clearer which 
show us why metaphysics is no longer an option in the face of  the Holocaust. First 
of  all, every thought refuses to grant the mass murder a metaphysical sense. 
Secondly, the industrialized killing and dying destroys one of  the fundaments of  
traditional metaphysics, the retrospective dependence of  metaphysical speculation 
on the experience of  the single person that was established by the personal fear of  
one’s own death. Death now faces the individual in a mechanized form and proves 
the nullity of  the individual: the nullity of  its existence at all, the nullity of  its 
own individuality. This becomes clear when the individual, as a mere copy of  a 
type or race, i.e. a general disposition, suffers the same automated death with 
several other individuals. Thirdly, there is, in Adorno’s opinion, an even deeper 
structure that causes the failure or ‘fall’ of  metaphysics. This is, again, due to the 
fact that Auschwitz is not only a failure of  a particular form of  metaphysically 
impregnated philosophizing, but also a failure of  culture, to which this 
metaphysical philosophy belongs as a part and an expression of  itself. Therefore 
“[a]ll post-Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage” (Adorno 
1992, 367). By this diagnosis, that metaphysics should not just be regarded as a 
superfluous counter model, but as an expression of  a failed culture itself. The 
opposition of  metaphysical speculation (at least for morality) and the healthy, life-
world rooted reality of  actions, as a kind of  pragmatist antitheses stipulated by 
Rorty, should be understood as total. “That this could happen in the midst of  
traditions of  philosophy, of  art, and of  the enlightening sciences says more than 
that these traditions and their spirit lacked the power to take hold of  men and 
work a change in them. There is untruth in those fields themselves, in the autarky 
that is emphatically claimed for them” (Adorno 1992, 366-7). That means that the 
dreadful kind of  thought that finds its manifestation in the concentration camps 
is also at work in philosophy and science in a clandestine way. This thought even 
functions as a basis for the highest forms of  culture – such as philosophy, art, and 
science – and it essentially neglects the special and singular features of  the 
particular being in favor of  the identical aspects this being has in common with 
other things. It is this tendency to neglect and to level what is special and non-
identical which is essential to theoretical and metaphysical thought and which 
becomes reality in the fascist genocide. Thus it becomes clear, that for Adorno, 
metaphysics (which is deeply based on the deluded principle of  identification and 
the conceited preponderance of  the universal), cannot present a remedy for a 
horrid reality that is constituted by the same principles and of  which it is a part. 
Now, one might be inclined to turn Adorno’s considerations in a way that 
might lead one to admit that the Holocaust was just one breakthrough of  
barbarism with roots specifically in Western European culture and its cultural 
forms. One then could call for a different way of  thinking that takes the non-
identical more strongly into account and for a philosophy that also gives us the 
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consolation that thought will develop in such a way that we will never let 
Auschwitz happen again. By this Auschwitz would somehow get a meaning, 
namely just that we would have now been placed in a position, once and for all, to 
learn from our mistakes and to change our thinking and living. Furthermore, one 
could think that it is exactly Rorty’s undogmatic approach that answers to the 
non-pragmatic but metaphysical based western European thought that lead to 
Auschwitz.  
That this is no option for Adorno has been made clear before. But why this is 
so becomes clearer whilst understanding how far reaching Adorno’s diagnosis is. 
First of  all, Adorno would disagree with the thesis that the barbaric logic of  
identification, that is the very texture of  Auschwitz, is just a past Western 
European phenomenon that could be eliminated by decision. The reason for this 
gives a second point, which is that none of  the forms of  high culture (philosophy, 
art, science) are autonomous regions, which only accidentally come into contact 
with society. On the contrary: All three of  them are essentially connected with 
society, which enforces its fixed constants and structures of  thought upon them. 
Thirdly: The very essence of  this kind of  thought, which is substantiated as 
society and the forms of  life imposed by it, consist in identifying and making the 
unequal equal. In Adorno’s eyes, this is true not only for Western European 
culture but also for North American capitalism – in which Adorno sees as nothing 
else but the totalitarian completion of  Western European culture. Thus, Adorno’s 
diagnosis which concerns European culture also concerns North American 
capitalism; both are deeply rooted within the logics of  identification. 
Auschwitz, thus, is not a break-in of  barbarism into the enlightened capitalist 
society, but the realization of  its very structure. This is the reason why the end of  
the concentration camps is not the end of  the spell of  identification. It rather 
subsists within capitalist societies and takes over all spheres of  life. That is why 
“there is nothing innocuous left” (Adorno 2005, 25). The seemingly innocent 
affable small talk is doomed by the spell of  identification and implicitly sanctifies 
the existing order.” Even the blossoming tree lies the moment its bloom is seen 
without the shadow of  terror” (Adorno 2005, 25). Every human and interpersonal 
relation is determined by this leveling, identifying, that is thought and form of  
existence and life at the same time. This has severe consequences for Rorty’s 
position. The selfsame living environment that according to Rorty serves as a 
corrective against metaphysical ideas, which are out of  touch with the real world, 
is, according to Adorno, nothing else but a monstrous structure of  repression 
itself. 
Things get even worse for Rorty’s concept. The spell of  identification, that 
haunts society, tends to conceal itself. It is a universal context of  deception and a 
ban that does not release its subjects but deludes them by making them think of  
themselves as free persons whilst they are ruled and compelled. This context of  
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deception affects all regions of  culture and thus also philosophy. For example: a 
philosophy that promotes the liberalistic conception of  a human society promotes 
a society constituted by autonomous selves, who use instrumental rationality to 
pursue their own interests and to maximize utility. In Adorno’s eyes, such a 
philosophy indeed is a mere reproduction of  the solipsist way of  existence which is 
imposed upon people by a repressive society in order to make them subjects of  
control using the delusion of  freedom of  choice (an argument that, again, 
Nietzsche already developed). Thus, this philosophy sanctions, as a theory, the 
selfsame structures of  power that make the people submissive to the mechanisms 
of  capitalist society. From this perspective, Rorty’s theory does not appear to be 
an enlightened position which restores the immediate ethical substance of  
everyday life but an unconscious affirmation of  the machinery of  power.  
Although thinking and philosophy are enmeshed within the spell of  
identification and power, and unable to get out of  it, Adorno does not vote for a 
retreat from culture, thought, and philosophy for a return to rural life. This 
retreat again would simply sanction the power of  society and its immanent logics 
that would finally creep up again upon the retreater. Rather, we must think in a 
way that keeps the basic structure of  identification – that rules every thought – 
conscious, in order to overcome its own barbaric tendency to level the non-
identical and, in particular, in this self-reflexive manner. In other words: It is 
selfsame thinking that is cause and cure of  the problems at the same time by 
thinking ‘against itself ’ and its brutal tendency of  identification. The utopian aim 
of  such thinking is to unlock the non-identical and release it from its forced 
deformations, to let it show itself  and to give it a language of  expression without 
imposing leveling and identifying categories upon it. Such thinking would then 
not come to postulate some positive contents as examples of  ‘the non-identical’, 
but would consist in a constant negative dialectical criticism, which, in its process, 
would try to retrieve the non-identical out of  the context of  deception. This is the 
reason why such a negative dialectics is able to offer a certain potential 
consolation without being urged to name and strictly determine the consoling 
utopia; even less it is forced to evoke a belief  in transcendental eternal values in 
order to find some ‘metaphysical comfort’ against which Rorty so eloquently 
polemicizes. At the end stands a comfort that is only negative; it consists “in the 
gaze falling on horror, withstanding it, and in unalleviated consciousness of  
negativity holding fast to the possibility of  what is better.” (Adorno 2005, 25) In 
this figure of  negative dialectical thought Adorno is able to find his own idea of  
solidarity, which is, as quoted above, solidarity with metaphysics ‘at the time of  
its fall’. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
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We can conclude that Adorno’s approach goes far beyond the boundaries of  
Rorty’s criticism without restoring a simple naive moral realism of  a metaphysical 
kind. However, does this mean that we finally have to dismiss moral realism 
altogether? This does not seem necessary. At second sight one could indeed see a 
certain kind of  “moral realism” in Adorno’s philosophy. This, however, is not the 
moral realism Rorty attacks. It rather is a moral realism that recurs on something 
“real”, i.e. the non-identical that serves as the measure of  a thinking, that tries to 
break the ban of  identification without being so naive to think that the mere 
intention is the deed.  
This realism would be a moral one insofar as the negative dialectical 
movement of  thought follows the intention to let the non-identical to be free in its 
otherness and dissolve it from its forced transformations. This is not realism 
because it claims the existence of  eternal values; it is realism because it aims at a 
change of  reality; it is realism because the non-identical is “real” as much as it can 
be freed from the spell of  identification by negative dialectical thinking. 
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